This paper investigates the profitability of City, Trust, Regional, Second Association Regional, Shinkin and Credit Cooperative banks following the major financial crisis that affected Japan in the mid 1990s. We find evidence that well capitalised, efficient banks, with lower credit risks tend to outperform less capitalised, less efficient counterparts with higher credit risks. Second Association Regional banks and Shinkin banks (but not other ownership types) appear to benefit from diversification advantages which feed through to profitability. Furthermore, we find that industry concentration, GDP growth and stock market development play an important role in determining the profitability of Japanese banks.
Introduction
Following a period of financial deregulation and increased competition in the banking and financial sectors, Japan was hit by a major financial crisis between 1997 and 1998. A number of housing loan companies (Jusen), cooperative banks, regional banks and larger banks failed over this period while others were bailed out or nationalised. Such failures and bailouts led to contagion in bank equity prices as investors sought to impose greater discipline on the banks which survived (SPIEGEL and YAMORI, 2004) . Between the periods 1998 to 2000 a number of measures were introduced to stabilise the financial system. These measures (many of which were included in the Financial Function Stabilization Act) included: temporary government control or closure of insolvent institutions; capital injections; strengthening deposit insurance guarantees, the creation of asset management companies (to buy bad loans from banks) and changes in loan losses provisioning rules (MONTGOMERY and SHIMIZUTAMI, 2009 ). However, many argued that the government response to the crisis was slow and uncoordinated and may have exacerbated the lack of confidence in the banking industry. Overall, the lack of coherence in government policy, the small scale of asset purchases and capital injections to the banking system all acted to exacerbate an already serious situation (HOSHI and KASHYAP, 2008) .
Banks themselves found it difficult to recapitalise as profits and external capital from market participants was low. Further, the ability of banks to extend finance to the corporate sector was curtailed as a result of the high level of nonperforming assets. Consequently, banks reduced lending while tightening credit terms.
Stock market values and real investment declined, and the economy entered a long lasting recession (NAKASO, 2001; HAYASHI and PRESCOTT, 2002; BREWER et al, 2003; DECKLE and KLETZER, 2003) . This has led to Japanese Banks recording low levels of profitability for an extended period (HATTORI ET AL, 2007) . In 2007, the Japanese government published The Plan for Strengthening the Competitiveness of Japan's Financial and Capital Markets. A number of measures proposed under this plan seek to improve the regulatory and supervisory environment of the financial services industry in order to promote the international competitiveness of the Japanese Financial Services industry and improve the performance of incumbent banks.
Loosely drawing parallels between the Japanese crisis and the recent global financial crisis, this paper investigates the return to profitability of Japanese banks.
Specifically, this study utilises a dynamic model of profitability to examine the extent to which bank-specific, industry-specific and macroeconomic factors determine the The results presented in this paper suggest that bank profitability and its determinants differ across ownership types. Specifically, while profits persist across all ownership types (implying that competition does not adjust profits to long run values instantaneously). This persistence is much stronger for the larger regional and cooperative (Shinkin) banks than their smaller (Second Association Regional and
Other Cooperative) counterparts. For all bank types (except for Trust banks), high capital ratios are associated with high profitability. Second Association Regional banks and Shinkin banks (but not other ownership types) appear to benefit from diversification advantages which feed through to profitability. Market share enhances the profitability of Shinkin banks and Other Cooperatives, but not other ownership types. Macroeconomic conditions appear to exert negative impact on Japanese banks' profitability. Overall, the results presented are of interest to policy makers and government agencies, as they suggest that the determinants and persistence of profits differs by ownership type. Furthermore, our results suggest that policies which encourage some bank ownership types to diversify their revenues streams, improve their capital levels and lower costs relative to income could generate significant welfare gains for the banking industry in Japan.
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides an overview of the Japanese Banking industry. Section 3 discusses the empirical methods. Section 4 presents the data analysis, and Section 5 provides a summary.
The Evolution of the Japanese Banking Industry
This section comprises two parts. The first part examines the banking crisis which affected the banking industry in Japan in the 1990s, and examines the policy responses. The second part provides a brief overview of the Japanese banking system.
The Japanese financial crisis and the regulatory response
The banking system in Japan underwent fundamental changes following the major financial crisis that commenced in the mid 1990s (CASU et al, 2006, chapter 16. Financial deregulation allowed small financial institutions to diversify into new areas and to lend to housing finance companies, while the deregulation and development of bond markets led to pressure on larger banks to find new ways of raising revenues (which led to banks increasing their lending to small firms and medium sized firms, and real estate developers (HOSHI and KASHYAP, 2000) . This crisis arose from a large increase in bad debts in the 1990s, which in turn had arisen from the rapid increase in financial asset and property prices from the mid-1980s, which acted as collateral to borrowers, and led to excessive bank lending in real estate and construction.
ii The loose monetary policy enacted by the Bank of Japan in the 1980s had created cheap credit, while subsequent tightening in the early 1990s led to a collapse in asset prices and the performance of bank loan books. While a decline in real estate prices triggered the crisis, the long lasting effects on the economy was perhaps just as much to do with structural problems within the Japanese banking industry and wider economy as with the disjointed government policy toward the resolution of the banking crisis (MOTONISHI and YOSHIKAWA, 1999) . The poor condition of a large number of borrowers has been reflected in the persistent loan losses recorded by Japanese banks (KASHYAP, 2002) . This coupled with a deflationary macroeconomic environment, low margins charged on loans (and a lack of revenue diversification to offset these), losses incurred on investments in South East Asia in the late 1990s, high labour costs and low levels of investment in new process technologies all explain the poor performance of Japanese Banks relative to their European and US counterparts (CRAIG, 1998 , KASHYAP, 2002 HATTORI ET AL, 2007) . This led to further government support and bail outs of banks thought too-big-to-fail, which led to a lack of market discipline on large banks (POP and POP, 2009 ).
In recent years a number of measures (many of which were included in the Financial Function Stabilization Act) were introduced to stabilise the financial system, to improve the regulatory and supervisory environment and to promote the performance international competitiveness of the Japanese financial services industry. 
The Japanese banking sector
The banking system in Japan consists of commercial, savings and cooperative financial institutions. These comprise large City Banks, Trust Banks, Regional Banks, Second Association Regional Banks, Shinkin Banks and Credit Cooperatives.
City banks are large in size with branches in major cities throughout Japan and beyond. Consequently, these are national banks with a wide geographic scope. They 
Empirical Methods
The purpose of the estimable model outlined in this section is to capture the effects of various bank-specific, industry-specific and macroeconomic factors on bank profitability.
A dynamic model is adopted via the inclusion of a lagged dependent variable among the regressors because previous literature shows that bank profits tend to persist over time, reflecting impediments to market competition, informational opacity and/or sensitivity to regional/macroeconomic shocks (BERGER et al, 2000) .
A range of variables that have been used in previous empirical studies on bank profitability are also included. These include variables (together with past profitability) such as: equity capital over total assets, liquidity, credit risk, market share, efficiency, diversification, industry concentration, real GDP growth and stock market capitalisation.
The model is specified as:
 is the profitability of bank i at time t and
X is a vector of exogenous bank-specific regressors and t M is a vector of country-specific variables. i  is a fixed effect, and it  is a random disturbance.In and can dramatically improve efficiency. Since it builds a system of two equations, the original equation as well as the transformed one, is known as System GMM (ROODMAN, 2006) . Hence the two-step System GMM estimator is used to conduct the analysis. For City banks and Trust banks where 'N' is not sufficient enough to be estimated by using System GMM, we use fixed effects model instead.
The moment conditions are valid only if there is no serial correlation in the idiosyncratic errors. Because the first difference of independently and identically distributed idiosyncratic errors will be auto correlated, rejecting the null hypothesis of no serial correlation at order one in the first-differenced errors does not imply that the model is mis-specified. Rejecting the null hypothesis at higher orders implies that the moment conditions are not valid. Hence, second-order autocorrelation tests are conducted to address the validity of our models. Sargan test of over-identifying restrictions are also conducted to ensure the validity of instrumental variables.
The dependent variables are three commonly used profitability measures:
return on average equity (ROE), return on average asset (ROA) and net interest margins (NIM). ROE is measured as net income over equity, while ROA is measured by net income over assets. Net interest margins are defined as the differences between interest income and interest cost divided by net interest earning assets. Throughout the study the profit rate of bank Insert Table 1 Descriptive statistics of bank profitability in Japan <Insert Table 2 Summary statistics of explanatory variables>
In Table 2 (panel a), the summary statistics on the other covariates that are used in our estimable model over the sample period are presented, while Table 2 (panel b) presents the summary statistics (mean) of these covariates by ownership type. As we can see from Table 2 Trust banks have the highest capital to total assets ratio (23.3%), which is followed by City banks (10.01%). All other regional and cooperative banks have capital-asset ratios between 4% to 6%. Collectively, both Regional and Second Association Regional banks have higher loan-assets ratios than both Shinkin and
Other Cooperative banks. This may reflect the fact that both regional banks are larger in size and thus have more business opportunities in lending than their cooperative counterparts. Trust banks have the lowest loan-assets ratio. This also reflects a focus on asset and wealth management business rather than deposit taking and lending. City banks appear more efficient than other types of banks in terms of cost-to-income ratio, which is only slightly lower than 50 percent. Again, both Regional and Second Association Regional Banks appear more efficient than their Shinkin and Other
Cooperative banking counterparts, indicated by their lower cost-to-income ratios. City banks have the lowest credit risks in terms of impaired loans to gross loans ratio (4.69%). Shinkin banks have the highest credit risks (9.92%) among all bank ownership types, perhaps due to placing members' requirements for finance above prudent risk management. 
Insert

Japanese banks
Equation (1) is estimated across the six different ownership types. Table 3 presents the results for our ROE measure. Tables 4 and 5 The estimated persistence of profit coefficients λ reported in Tables 3 to 5 show that they are significant in virtually most cases. Table 3 shows the results using ROE as a proxy for bank performance. In all sets of estimations there are quite large differences between ownership types in the magnitudes of the persistence coefficients ranging from a low of 0.096 (Other Cooperatives) to a high of 0.264 (Shinkin banks).
It is interesting to note that Shinkin banks are simply larger counterparts of Other
Cooperatives, and as such may be allowed to operate in more than one prefecture.
Although under prudential regulation with not-for-profit nature, Shinkin banks enjoy some benefits relative to their City and Regional Banking counterparts, including paying lower rates of tax on any profit (surplus), lower fees on licences and registration for the opening of new offices. All these benefits may translate to better ability to sustain profits from year to year. On the other hand, Other Cooperatives can only operate in single prefecture and provide limited services to member firms and individuals due to its size disadvantage. Hence, these Credit Cooperatives have less ability to sustain their profits over a sustained period.
In most cases, profits persistence is more pronounced for our ROE measure than our ROA measure (see Table 4 ). The profit (ROA) persistence coefficient is only significant for the Second Association Regional Bank (0.054). This could be because the former is more easily manipulated by senior management via stock buy-backs, new issues, changes in provisioning practices, shareholder value strategies and so on, or simply by adjusting retained earnings. Pooling our sample across ownership types and re-estimating equation (1) gives a λ estimate of 0.118 for ROE and 0.066 for ROA.
Consistently robust profit persistence coefficients are found in Table 5 Diversifying product provision through non-interest income generating business may lead to mistakes being made resulting in losses in both non-interest income and net interest margins.
The capital-assets ratio (KA) is positive and significant in most regressions. The loans-to-assets ratio (LA) enters most of profit (ROE and ROA) regressions insignificantly. This implies that banks' liquidity conditions do not impact on profitability. However, significantly positive signs are found in NIM regressions for most ownership types except City and Trust banks. This indicates a negative relationship between liquidity ratio and net interest margins, since high loans-to-assets ratio means low liquidity. This is consistent with previous literature. A bank with relatively more liquid assets is better prepared to meet these unforeseen contingencies (Berger and Bouwman, 2009) . Liquidity stored in a bank's balance sheet also serves as a cushion or buffer against losses arising from the 'fire-sale' of assets to meet liquidity need. Hence, sufficient liquidity may mean less liquidity risk, which may reduce interest margins due to a lower premium charged on loans (AFANASIEFF et al, 2002) .
Cost-to-income ratio (CI) is found to have negative effects on profitability across different ownerships for all profitability measures (ROE, ROA and NIM), implying that banks with efficient management are more able to reduce costs, which feed through to higher profits. This result is consistent with much of the previous empirical banking literature (see BERGER, 1995; GODDARD et al, 2001) .
A negative relation between credit risk (IMP) and profitability (ROE and ROA)
is found across all ownership types. This is consistent with the view that banks in Japan with higher credit risks be less profitable (see UCHIDA and NAKAGAWA, 2007) . While in NIM regressions, significantly positive relationships are found for
Regional, Second Association Regional, Shinkin and Other Cooperative banks, but not City and Trust banks. The risk of non-repayment or default on a credit (credit risk)
requires banks to apply a risk premium implicitly to interest rates charged for their operations. Furthermore, to better manage increasing credit risk, banks may incur additional expenses to intensify their monitoring of loans (BARAJAS et al, 1999) .
Thus, banks tend to require higher net interest margins to compensate for higher credit risks. Table 3 Table 2 , panel b), an increase in market shares for both types of cooperative banks may enable these banks to benefit from declining average costs (economies of scale), which feed through to increased profitability. The signs for real GDP growth are conflicting across ownership types and profitability measures. However, when pooling the whole sample together, the signs are negative for all profitability regressions. These results at least partly support the view that high economic growth improves business environment and lowers bank entry barriers. The consequently increased competition dampens banks' profitability.
Market capitalisation (MC) enters all ROE and ROA regressions significantly and negatively, except for City and Trust banks viii . The ratio of market capitalisation of listed companies over GDP reflects, to some extent, the whole country's business cycle. A high market capitalisation ratio means economic expansion, and the easy access for firms to finance through stock markets reduces banks' business opportunities, resulting in a decrease in profits. This is consistent with the view of Miller-Modigliani theorem, which states that, in the absence of taxes and bankruptcy costs, debt and equity finance are purely substitutes. Given that bank deposits are the major form of Japanese individual investors' wealth, the improvement of stock market as well as more sophisticated financial products, such as asset-backed securities and real estate investment trusts, will undoubtedly take away bank deposits and leads to reduced business opportunities. The significantly positive relationships found between market capitalisation and NIM in City and Trust banks, however, may indicate that these types of banks have more control over customers and face less elastic demand curves.
Summary
This paper has reported the results of an investigation as to the determinants Overall, these results are of interest to policy makers and government agencies monitoring competition, as they suggest that while profits converge to long run values, this process is by no means instantaneous, and tends to differ by ownership type. Furthermore, the results suggest that policies which encourage some bank ownership types to diversify their revenues streams, improve their capital levels and lower costs relative to income could generate significant welfare gains for the banking industry in Japan. Overall, the results of the analysis presented above suggest differences in the performance between those banks with a regional focus (Regional, Second Association Regional, Shinkin and Other Cooperatives) and their nationwide counterparts (City and Trust banks). The dependent variable is ROA after normalization. System GMM estimator is applied to Eq(1) for Regional, Second Association Regional, Shinkin, Other Cooperative banks as well as the whole banking system (Overall). While due to the data restrictions, fixed effects estimator is applied to Eq(1) for City and Trust banks. 'Sarganp' is the p-value of the Sargan test statistic of over-identifying restrictions, while AR(2) is the p-value of the second order autocorrelation test statistic. P-values of the estimated coefficients are reported in brackets. Year dummies from 2001 through 2007 are included in the model when system GMM estimator is used but not reported in the table. *, **, and *** represent 10, 5 and 1 percent significance level, respectively. The dependent variable is NIM after normalization. System GMM estimator is applied to Eq(1) for Regional, Second Association Regional, Shinkin, Other Cooperative banks as well as the whole banking system (Overall). While due to the data restrictions, fixed effects estimator is applied to Eq(1) for City and Trust banks. 'Sarganp' is the p-value of the Sargan test statistic of over-identifying restrictions, while AR (2) Other cooperative City Trust i JENSEN and MECKLING (1976), FAMA (1980) and FAMA AND JENSEN (1983) suggest that a lack of capital market discipline weakens owners' control over management, leaving management free to pursue its own interests with few incentives to be efficient.
ii UCHIDA and NAKAGAWA (2007) show that Japanese city and regional banks has acted as a herd in the types of lending they engaged in over the period 1975-2000. iii The empirical findings of the importance of regional/community banks to prevailing economic conditions can be found in MAUDOS and FERNANDEZ DE GUEVARA (2009).
iv Potential bias could arise from the use of accounting rates of return rather than economic profits. However, according to GEROSKI and JACQUEMIN (1988) , persistently high accounting rates of return indicate persistently high economic rates of return. Hence, this bias is unlikely to be important in persistency studies. In the rest of this section we provide a brief rationale for the inclusion of our other independent variables.
v Banks reporting extreme values (larger than 99 percentile or smaller than 1 percentile of the sample) or very large unexplained changes in the profitability measures (4 standard deviations outside the average change) were excluded. vi The significantly higher persistence level of NIM than ROE and ROA perhaps indicates that interest income is less volatile than non interest income.
vii The negative relationship between bank concentration and profitability has also been found by BERGER (1995) and CROWLEY (2007) .
viii This result partly supports previous empirical findings that regional macroeconomic conditions have significant impact on banks with a regional focus. (see DALY et al 2003 , WILLIAMS and GARDENER 2003 , YEAGER 2004 , FURLONG and KRAINER 2007 , CIHAK and HESSE 2007 , VAONA 2008 .
